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Can Social Security Improve
Its Future Solvency Problem
by Investing in Private Securities?
Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. Shoven
Policy makers widely accept that social security faces a long-run solvency
problem. The social security trustees publish a seventy-ﬁve-year forecast
of the OASDI system’s ﬁnances every year. Since the 1983 amendments,
the forecast has gotten consistently more ominous. Figure 1.1 shows the
intermediate-assumptions forecast for the trust fund balances in 1983,
1985, and 1998.
The trustees’ 1998 report has the OASDI trust fund completely depleted
in 2032 (when the youngest baby boomer, born in 1964, will be sixty-eight)
rather than 2063 (when the same individual will be ninety-nine years old),
the forecast that immediately followed the 1983 social security amend-
ments. The report has as the intermediate or “best-guess” forecast that the
system’s income (not counting net interest income on the special issue
bonds held in the trust fund) will fall short of its costs beginning in 2013.
In 1999, the surplus was projected to be 1.52 percent of covered payroll,
but this turns negative in 2013, and, by the end of the trustees’ forecasting
period (2075), the annual shortfall under the intermediate set of assump-
tions is forecast to be 6.43 percent of covered payroll. That means that, if
we operated the system strictly on a pay-as-you-go basis, the payroll tax
rate would have to be increased by 6.43 percentage points to achieve bal-
ance in 2075. The 2075 OASDI deﬁcit (with the intermediate-assumptions
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11forecast) amounts to 4.26 percent of GDP. One way to look at the ﬁnan-
cial solvency problem of social security is that the intermediate forecast is
for fourteen years of modest and declining surpluses, followed by ever-
growing deﬁcits as far as the eye can see. Against that we have a relatively
small trust fund (currently $760 billion) that generates roughly $40 billion
of interest income but that is now forecast to be completely depleted by
2032, as shown in ﬁgure 1.1. Naturally, the ﬁnancial situation for OASDI
is much worse under the trustees’ high-cost set of assumptions. With them,
the date of OASDI trust fund exhaustion is 2022. The date when payroll-
tax receipts ﬁrst fall short of beneﬁt payments is 2006, and the eventual
shortfall of income to costs in 2075 is 16.04 percent of taxable payroll.
The social security trustees summarize the seventy-ﬁve year outlook for
OASDI by computing the long-run actuarial balance. In 1998, the
seventy-ﬁve year actuarial balance was in deﬁcit by 2.19 percent of cov-
ered payroll with the trustees’ intermediate assumptions. What that means
is that, had the payroll tax been immediately increased in 1998 by 2.19
percentage points and the increase maintained for the next seventy-ﬁve
years, the life of the trust fund would have been extended to the seventy-
ﬁve-year horizon under the intermediate set of economic and demographic
assumptions. Even under this hypothetical scenario, the payroll-tax pro-
ceeds would be less than beneﬁt payments under the currently legislated
beneﬁt structure beginning in roughly 2020. Further, the seventy-ﬁve-year
actuarial balance would last for exactly one year; with every passing year,
one fewer surplus year would be in the seventy-ﬁve-year window, and one
more deﬁcit year would be included. The immediate payroll-tax increase
needed to ﬁx the solvency problem of the current OASDI system perma-
nently would be signiﬁcantly greater than 2.19 percent. Steven Goss
(1999), of the Oﬃce of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration,
has estimated that the permanent or open-ended actuarial deﬁcit is 4.7
percent of covered payroll under the intermediate set of assumptions.
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Fig. 1.1 Three forecasts of the OASDI trust fund balancesAll this illustrates the dimensions of the problem of returning the ex-
isting OASDI system to long-run solvency. Operating within the existing
structure of social security, there are only two obvious paths: raise taxes
or cut beneﬁts, or both. If we take Goss’s 4.7 percent of covered payroll
ﬁgure for the perpetual actuarial deﬁcit, permanently ﬁxing the ﬁnances
of the system (under the intermediate set of economic and demographic
assumptions) will require immediate tax increases or beneﬁt cuts totaling
38 percent. If the implementation of these steps is delayed, as it almost
certainly will be, then the beneﬁt cuts and tax increases will need to be
larger. Neither tax increases nor beneﬁt cuts of this magnitude are eco-
nomically or politically attractive. Naturally, people are looking for a more
palatable way out of the social security solvency problem.
One natural place to look is the investment returns earned on the trust
fund. Currently, the trust fund is exclusively invested in special nonmar-
ketable U.S. government bonds. When these bonds are issued, their inter-
est rate is set at the average interest rate of marketable Treasury bonds
with a maturity of four years or more. The bonds have one special feature,
which oﬀsets their nonmarketability: they are redeemable at par at any
time. This feature is not generally available on publicly held bonds and
notes, with the exception of U.S. government savings bonds. The special
issue bonds are certainly safe, with no price risk and with the principal
and interest fully backed by the U.S. government, but Treasury interest
rates are somewhat less than what is oﬀered on AAA corporate bonds and
trail the average total return earned on common stocks by a wide margin.
The question that we address in this paper is whether a signiﬁcant frac-
tion of the whole solvency problem could reliably be solved by having the
Social Security Administration invest the OASDI trust fund in higher-
yielding private securities. The analysis in MaCurdy and Shoven (1992)
suggests that such a strategy might yield an improvement in social securi-
ty’s ﬁnances.1 Of course, there is a more fundamental question regarding
whether society as a whole would beneﬁt from this new asset allocation.
Another question that we address is how risky such a change in the trust
fund asset allocation would be and who would bear that risk. Related to
this question, we discuss the feasibility of social security delivering a true
deﬁned-beneﬁt pension program to its participants.
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1. Our paper investigated the eﬀects of deﬁned-contribution accumulators consistently
acquiring stocks or bonds for careers between 1926 and 1989. We showed that stock accumu-
lators consistently ended up with more money than bond accumulators for all careers longer
than twenty years in the period 1926–89. The result is weakened by the fact that we used
only the actual historical pattern of ﬁnancial returns and that there are only three completely
independent twenty-year runs of data in the period 1926–89. We extended the data to 1876–
1990 in an unpublished manuscript. There we found that the career length had to be forty
years before stock accumulators always ended up ahead of bond accumulators. Once again,
the data limitations do not allow one to predict with conﬁdence the likelihood of stocks
outperforming bonds for long careers. In the present paper, we try to get around the data
limitations by using the bootstrap statistical procedures.1.1 The Proposals
We focus on two of the reform proposals that rely on investing the cen-
tral trust fund in higher-yielding private securities in order to maintain the
general beneﬁt structure of social security. However, our analysis is ap-
plicable to any plan that attempts to make progress on the solvency of the
system by simply reallocating portfolios toward higher-yielding securities,
including the plan outlined by President Clinton in his 1999 State of the
Union Address. The two plans of this type that we describe in detail are the
“maintain-beneﬁts” (MB) proposal of the 1994–96 Advisory Council (of-
ten referred to as the Bob Ball plan) and the plan oﬀered recently by Henry
AaronandRobertReischauer(1998).Amongthemeasuresthatbothplans
advocate, the asset reallocation is credited with the largest eﬀect on reduc-
ing or eliminating the seventy-ﬁve-year actuarial deﬁcit.
The details of the two plans are shown in table 1.1. There are many simi-
larities between them. The numbers in the tables come directly from Aaron
and Reischauer (1998, table 6-1) and from volume 1 of the Report of the
1994–96 Advisory Council on Social Security (SSA 1997, table 1, app. II).
The ﬁgures are based on estimates of the Oﬃce of the Actuary of the
Social Security Administration, assuming the intermediate alternative II
economic and demographic conditions. The numbers for the same action
may diﬀer slightly for the two plans since the estimates for the Aaron-
Reischauer plan were made roughly two years later than those for the MB
plan. Further, the plans diﬀer slightly in how they implement each mea-
sure. Even with that said, both proposals have the same goal—to deal
with the seventy-ﬁve-year actuarial deﬁcit within the context of the cur-
rent structure of beneﬁts. Both assume that the measurement of the CPI
will be changed in ways that lower oﬃcial inﬂation and cause the pro-
gram’s costs to grow more slowly.2 Both advocate covering all newly hired
state and local workers, increasing the number of years included in the
AIME (average indexed monthly earnings) formula from thirty-ﬁve to
thirty-eight, and taxing all social security beneﬁts received over and above
the employees’ own actual contributions. Both proposals characterize
their changes in the personal income taxation of social security beneﬁts
as putting them on the same basis as private pension income. However,
their plans involve signiﬁcantly higher taxes than the Schieber-Shoven
PSA-2000 plan, which also claims to put social security and private pen-
sion beneﬁts on the same tax footing (Schieber and Shoven 1999). The
PSA-2000 plan taxes half of social security beneﬁts on the argument that
half of social security contributions were made with before-tax money (the
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2. Many wage contracts are oﬃcially or unoﬃcially tied to the CPI. It is not clear that the
Oﬃce of the Actuary took the feedback of changing the oﬃcial CPI on wages into account.
If not, the gain from the restructuring of the CPI may be exaggerated.employer contribution) and half with after-tax dollars (the employee con-
tribution). Essentially, Schieber and Shoven’s plan would have half the
contributions treated like a Roth IRA (after-tax contributions with tax-
free withdrawals) and half like a regular IRA (before-tax contributions
with taxable withdrawals). In contrast, the Aaron-Reischauer and Ball
plans tax 85 percent or more of social security beneﬁts.
The MB plan contains two features that Aaron and Reischauer did not
choose to copy. One is a 1.6 percentage point payroll-tax increase in 2045,
and the other is a redirection of money from Medicare to OASDI. The
latter feature of the MB plan seems ill advised as the long-run ﬁnances of
Medicare are in worse shape than are those of OASDI. Similarly, the
Aaron-Reischauer plan contains several features not in the MB plan.
These include accelerating and extending the increase in the age of normal
retirement, advancing the age of early retirement, and readjusting the
spousal and surviving spouse beneﬁts. The Oﬃce of the Actuary of Social
Security estimates that, both plans if enacted immediately and completely,
Table 1.1 Contribution of Each Feature of the Aaron-Reischauer Plan and the
Maintain-Beneﬁts Plan to the 75-Year OASDI Actuarial Deﬁcit
(all numbers are % of covered payroll)
Aaron-Reischauer Maintain-Beneﬁts
Plan Plan
Projected long-term deﬁcit 2.19 2.17
Eﬀect of assumed changes by BLS in CPI
measurement .45 .31
Cover all newly hired state and local employees .21 .22
Increase the number of years in the AIME
formula from 35 to 38 .25 .28
Tax 85% of social security beneﬁts .36 .31
Increase the OASDI payroll tax in 2045 by a
combined 1.6 percentage points N.A. .22
Redirect revenue for taxation of beneﬁts from
hospital insurance to OASDI starting in 2010 N.A. .31
Raise the normal retirement age to 67 by
2011, and then index further increases
to improvements in mortality .49 N.A.
Raise the age of early retirement eligibility to 64
by 2011, and then index further increases to
improvements in mortality .23 N.A.
Gradually reduce spouse’s beneﬁt from 50 to
33.33%; raise beneﬁts for surviving spouses
to 75% of couple’s combined beneﬁt .15 N.A.
Gradually invest part of the trust fund assets in
private stocks and bonds 1.20 .82
75-year deﬁcit with plan .85 .24
Note: N.A.  not applicable.
Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation 15would more than eliminate the seventy-ﬁve-year actuarial deﬁcit of the
system.
The common feature of the two plans shown in table 1.1 is that the
biggest contributor to eliminating the long-run solvency problem is in-
vesting part of the OASDI trust fund in private securities. The two plans
diﬀer in the details of how they would do that. In fact, the MB plan in the
1994–96 Advisory Council report suggests that further study be given to
the idea before implementation. Nonetheless, when the Advisory Council
scored the plan to see whether it achieved the goal of eliminating the
seventy-ﬁve-year actuarial deﬁcit, it included the provision that the trust
fund would begin investing in stocks in the year 2000 and that the propor-
tion of trust fund assets in stocks would gradually rise until it reached 40
percent in 2015. The assumed real rate of return on the stock portion of
the portfolio in the MB plan is 7.0 percent. The Aaron-Reischauer plan is
to have the trust fund balances that exceed 150 percent of one year’s bene-
ﬁts gradually invested in common stocks and corporate bonds. Since the
OASDI trust fund balances currently exceed the 150 percent of annual
payout criterion, the switch to private securities would begin immediately
under the Aaron-Reischauer program. Remarkably, Aaron and Reisch-
auer estimate that 55 percent of the whole actuarial deﬁcit of 2.19 percent
of payroll would be eliminated by this asset reallocation alone. They also
estimate that the combination of the asset reallocation and the eﬀect of
the changes that the Bureau of Labor Statistics is making in the construc-
tion of the CPI eliminates over 75 percent of social security’s projected
long-term deﬁcit. Any 75 percent cure that is this painless deserves care-
ful scrutiny.
1.2 The Net Transaction
The net transaction involved in having the central OASDI trust fund
invest a portion of its assets in common stocks is an asset swap. Social
security or the federal government sells additional government bonds to
the public and uses the proceeds to acquire common stock from the public.
In the social security context, the system is selling one set of assets (U.S.
government bonds) in order to acquire another set of assets (a diversiﬁed
portfolio of common stocks) of equal value. Of course, this transaction
can be examined without reference to social security’s ﬁnancial problems
at all. The real issue is whether the government can improve the welfare
of taxpayers (or social security participants) by issuing and selling bonds
and using the proceeds to buy common stocks.
There are at least two reasons to be skeptical about the advantages of
the net transaction being discussed. First, the total capital stock and
wealth in the economy (at least to a ﬁrst approximation) are unaﬀected
by the asset swap. Therefore, the level of GDP and national income is
unchanged. If social security or the government can systematically im-
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which presumably is on the other side of the transaction, is systematically
losing. It is hard to imagine that the politicians and bureaucrats running
social security are systematically getting the better of the pension fund
managers and institutional investors who are buying the bonds from the
government in exchange for common stocks. It is possible, of course, that
the exchange could be played out on international capital markets so that
Americans as a whole could conceivably end up as net winners (or losers)
in the transaction. Second, there is the matter of risk. While stocks have a
much higher expected return than government bonds, they also involve
much higher risks (particularly given the fact that the current special issue
bonds have the feature that they can be redeemed at par at any time). The
two plans discussed above are very vague as to how much additional risk
the system would be assuming and how that risk would be shared among
taxpayers and social security participants. As we discuss in section 1.5
below, there is a real question about whether it is feasible to maintain a
universal coverage deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plan funded with risky secu-
rities.
Having the government exchange bonds for stocks in the hope of reliev-
ing the solvency problems of social security is a form of ﬁnancial engi-
neering. The recent history of such schemes is not promising. Savings and
loans sell short-term liabilities (certiﬁcates of deposit and demand depos-
its) and acquire higher-yielding long-term mortgages. The savings-and-
loan crisis of the 1980s was brought about when short-term interest rates
peaked in 1980 in the mid-teens when the savings-and-loan mortgage port-
folio yielded 6–8 percentage points less. The usual yield relation did not
hold, and the resulting bankruptcies and bailouts cost taxpayers massive
sums of money. The Orange County debacle resulted from a similar failed
attempt to exploit the shape of the yield curve. The recent massive losses
of hedge funds resulted from asset swaps that failed to perform as ex-
pected. Before the U.S. government engages in exchanging bonds for
stocks, careful analysis is clearly warranted.
1.3 Analyzing the Stocks-for-Bonds Swap
To gauge the riskiness of the net transaction of selling government
bonds and buying corporate stocks, we use market returns from 1954 to
1997 and simulate what would have happened had the government com-
pleted the transaction. We separately look at what would have happened
with the government selling ten-year and twenty-year bonds. We assume
that market returns would have been unaﬀected by the government trans-
action. This almost certainly favors the exchange strategy that in reality
might very well drive up interest rates and depress equity returns. The
counterfactual simulations have the government selling bonds in the past,
buying the S&P500 stock portfolio with the proceeds, and then paying
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portfolio. The strategy is deemed successful if all the payments on the
bonds can be made with the stock funds with money left over. The strategy
is deemed to have been a failure if the stock portfolio is unable to generate
suﬃcient cash to make the required bond payments. In the discussion
presented below, we initially explore how the strategy would have worked
with the actual time series of returns generated by the stock market (and
the actual historical interest rates on government bonds). The interest
rates are those published in the Economic Report of the President (1998)
and computed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The stock market returns are the “large company stocks” (i.e., S&P500)
total return series in Ibbotson Associates (1998). The problem with this
historical approach is that there are not many independent ten- or twenty-
year periods in our data set (1954–97). In fact, there are only four com-
pletely independent ten-year runs of data and two of twenty years. We
could add more data by examining pre-1954 information, and we do so in
some of the analyses in this section. There is a serious question about
whether adding data before 1954 helps or hurts when assessing the viabil-
ity of a proposed strategy for the twenty-ﬁrst century. The problem is that
the additional data are likely to be drawn from a diﬀerent regime and,
therefore, may do more harm than good to the analysis. After examining
the actual performance of the stock market in the period 1954–97, we
report on extensive bootstrap simulations of what could have happened
using the same annual return data, but now with the order of the returns
randomly scrambled according to a bootstrap statistical approach.
First, we examine the case of the government borrowing money for ten
years at the actual historical interest rates on U.S. government bonds and
investing in the S&P500. Figure 1.2 shows the money left over at the matu-
rity of the bonds (per dollar borrowed) after all bond payments had been
made out of the stock account. The net cost of the original asset swap is
zero, so any residual money is pure proﬁt, and any residual shortfall is
loss. Given our deﬁnition of success and failure, the asset-swap strategy
would have failed seven times out of the thirty-four counterfactual experi-
ments. The limitations of the actual historical record are very apparent in
the results, however. Basically, the strategy of the government issuing ten-
year bonds and buying the S&P500 would have worked from 1954 through
1964 and again from 1975 through 1987. However, it would have failed in
seven of the ten years 1965–74. This reﬂects the limitations of observing
only four completely independent ten-year sets of data. On an annual ba-
sis, the failure rate is seven of thirty-four, or 20.6 percent, but a more
informative way of reporting it is that the failure rate is roughly one in
four (from the fact that we had four non-overlapping stretches of data and
the strategy worked in three of the four). It should also be noted that our
criterion for success is very modest. We are not requiring that stocks
18 Thomas E. MaCurdy and John B. Shovenmatch the 7 percent real yield assumed in scoring the MB plan. Rather,
we are simply requiring that the stock returns were suﬃcient to pay oﬀ
the bonds, which had low or even negative ex post real returns (especially
in the 1970s).
While we have been focusing on the nontrivial chance of failure of the
asset-swap strategy, it should also be noted that ﬁgure 1.2 indicates that it
would indeed have worked twenty-seven of thirty-four times. Further,
when it works, the average gain is quite substantial. The numbers in the
ﬁgure represent the amount of money left in the stock account (per dollar
borrowed) at the maturity of the bonds. The overall average amount left
over for the thirty-four experiments is 78.5 cents per dollar borrowed; the
average over the twenty-seven years with positive outcomes is almost
$1.05. Of course, it is well known that, on average, stocks outperform
bonds by a wide margin. What is less well known is that borrowing money
for ten years to buy stocks is very risky—even with the favorable interest
rates available to the government.
To acquire a better sense of how such a government asset-swap policy
might work in the future, we have used the same set of 1954–97 stock
returns as the basis for generating simulated sequences of returns using a
moving-block bootstrap method to allow for autocorrelation. For each
year 1954–97, we calculate what would have happened had the govern-
ment borrowed additional money with ten-year bonds (at the actual pre-
vailing interest rate). The stock market return in the year of the borrowing
is taken as the actual return in that year. However, the succeeding real
returns for the next nine years are randomly chosen in blocks of three-
year sequences or “blocks” (with replacement) from the set of all realized
real returns. For example, in order to calculate how this strategy would
have worked in 1971, we compute the terms on the borrowed money ac-
cording to the prevailing nominal interest rates in 1971. Further, we as-
sume that the return on the stock market for the ﬁrst year was the actually
observed 1971 return. For the returns for the next nine years, we randomly
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Fig. 1.2 Net money generated at the completion of a swap of ten-year U.S.
government bonds for common stockschoose three dates (with replacement, meaning that the same date could
be chosen more than once) between 1954 and 1995. If we choose 1958,
1988, and 1956, for instance, then the ten-year string of real returns under
this simulation would be (R71, R58, R59, R60, R88, R89, R90, R56, R57, R58),
where Rt is the total real return of the S&P500 for year t. The fact that we
are choosing three-year blocks of data should be apparent in this sample
vector of returns. The real returns chosen via the bootstrap technique are
converted into nominal returns using actual historical inﬂation rates. For
instance, in the counterfactual experiment of borrowing money in 1971,
we use the actual inﬂation rates for 1971–80 to generate the nominal re-
turns resulting from the real returns chosen by the bootstrap process. For
each asset-swap year, we examine one thousand such random sequences
of returns.3 The failure rate for the strategy diﬀers by the year of the swap
because of diﬀerent interest rates and because of diﬀerent ﬁrst-year stock
market returns. The results of this bootstrap simulation are shown in ﬁg-
ure 1.3.
Implicitly, we have assumed that there is stability in the underlying prob-
ability distribution determining real stock returns during the period
1954–97 and that each observation was equally likely. Of course, it is cer-
tain that these assumptions are not entirely correct; it is also certain that
many low-probability events never occurred in the observation period. Fi-
nally, we are assuming that the same underlying probability distributions
that generated the 1954–97 observations will generate stock market re-
turns in the future. In total, this is a strong set of assumptions. Nonethe-
less, the implied results provide important insights. According to ﬁgure
1.3, the overall failure rate is predicted to be 22.1 percent, meaning that
the asset-swap policy failed 9,723 times in the 44,000 simulations we did
for the combined forty-four years of analysis. The expected failure rate for
the most recent ten-year period was 44.7 percent, owing to the higher real
interest rates of this period. Note that these failure rates are most likely
conservative since they still are based on the robust returns realized in U.S.
equity markets in the period 1954–97. These failure rates may therefore
form something of a lower bound on the riskiness of the asset-swap strat-
egy going forward.4
The patterns of failure probabilities shown in ﬁgure 1.3 stand in sharp
contrast to the success or failure patterns shown in ﬁgure 1.2 above, which
uses the actual realized time series of returns. The reasons for the diver-
gence are easily explained. The accelerating inﬂation of the 1970s was not
fully incorporated into government interest rates until 1981 and 1982. The
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3. Our preliminary analysis indicates that selecting block sizes 1, 2, 3, and 5 would not
change the main ﬁndings reported here.
4. Once again, we are concentrating on the failure probability as a measure of the riskiness
of the asset swap. The asset swap does work more than 50 percent of the time and often
generates large proﬁts.ex ante analysis of ﬁgure 1.3 shows that to be the period with the highest
chance of failure for the ten-year bonds-for-stocks swap (particularly with
the poor performance of the stock market in 1981). However, ex post the
stock market has performed extraordinarily well from 1982 to the present.
As a result, the asset-swap strategy would have worked in 1981 and 1982,
even though our bootstrap simulations show that it had a relatively low
probability of doing so. On the other hand, the ex ante failure probabilities
in 1965–72 were not particularly high; nonetheless, in fact, the strategy
wouldhavefailedinsixofthoseeightyears,asshowninﬁgure1.2.Thepoint
is that the returns that were actually experienced were just a single set of
draws from an economic and ﬁnancial system generating risky returns.
We perform the same analysis for twenty-year bonds. In this case, the
limitations of the data are even more severe since there are only two com-
pletely independent sets of twenty-year observations in the 1954–97 data
set. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to know how to interpret the fact that the
asset-swap strategy would have worked for every year 1954–77 using ac-
tual interest rates and the actual time series of stock market returns. This
says very little about the underlying chance of failure with a future policy
of swapping twenty-year government bonds for a diversiﬁed portfolio of
common stocks. The same bootstrap approach is used in this case as with
the ten-year bonds. Now, instead of a single historical set of stock market
returns, we can generate thousands of simulated sequences of returns gen-
erated from a random selection of the actual annual observations. The
results of doing that are shown in ﬁgure 1.4.
The pattern of failure probabilities is primarily determined by the actual
pattern of nominal interest rates on government bonds and by the actual
ﬁrst-year return on the stock market. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the general pattern of failure rates is similar in the twenty-year bond case
of ﬁgure 1.4 and the ten-year bond case of ﬁgure 1.3. The high failure
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Fig. 1.3 Failure rate by year of asset swap for ten-year bonds, bootstrap
simulations with three-year blocks, 1954–88probability (47.3 percent) for the asset-swap strategy in 1974 is due to the
fact that the real return on the S&P500 in 1974 was 34.5 percent. If
stocks lose more than one-third of their value immediately after bonds are
sold to buy stocks, the chances of making the swap work are greatly dimin-
ished.
For twenty-year bonds, the overall predicted failure rate during 1954–
78 is 6.24 percent. In the most recent ten-year period (1969–78), the fail-
ure rate is predicted to be 12.27 percent, which we view as a considerable
chance of failure. This suggests that, were the government to borrow
money by issuing twenty-year government bonds (assuming that it could
do so without raising interest rates), and were the real returns on the stock
market generated by the same process that produced the returns of
1954–97 (although with the ordering of the returns randomly scrambled),
the chance that the government would have to borrow additional money
when the bonds mature is about one in eight. The asset swap has a consid-
erable chance of being counterproductive in terms of the ﬁnances of the
federal government in general and social security in particular.
The historical record on interest rates also represents only a single set
of realizations of what might have happened. Future real (or nominal, for
that matter) interest rates may be higher or lower than what we have ob-
served in the past. To add some robustness to our results, we examine
what would have happened to the ﬁnances of the government had it issued
inﬂation-indexed bonds and bought stocks with the proceeds. In our ﬁrst
experiment, we set the real interest rate on ten-year inﬂation-protected
bonds at 3.5 percent. This is actually somewhat less than the recently ob-
served interest rate on this type of security. Each year, the principal on the
bonds is marked up to reﬂect realized inﬂation. The bonds are assumed
to pay 3.5 percent interest each year on the revised (i.e., inﬂation-adjusted)
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Fig. 1.4 Failure rate by year of asset swap for twenty-year bonds, bootstrap
simulations with three-year blocks, 1954–78principal amount and at maturity return the original investment marked
up by cumulative inﬂation. The question we want to ask is how likely it is
that an S&P500 stock portfolio can generate suﬃcient returns to pay oﬀ
the claims of such inﬂation-indexed bonds.
Once again, we can look at how this asset swap would have fared histori-
cally could it have been accomplished without aﬀecting the actually ob-
served stock market returns. In this case, we have used the observed stock
market returns and inﬂation rates for the period 1927–97 and examined
counterfactual asset swaps for the sixty-one years 1927–87. Basically, we
have six full and completely independent (i.e., nonoverlapping) runs of
ten-year data. Figure 1.5 shows the results for this case with ten-year
inﬂation-indexed bonds. The strategy would have failed eighteen times out
of the sixty-one years examined, for a failure rate of 29.5 percent. The
failures are strongly autocorrelated, however, because of the overlapping
returns. If the swap strategy fails in year t, it is quite likely that it will also
fail in year t  1 since the two experiments involve nine common years of
stock market returns. Not surprisingly, ﬁgure 1.5 shows that the asset-swap
strategy would have had mixed success in the period 1927–40, followed by
twenty-three years of complete success, followed by eleven years in a row
of failure and, ﬁnally, by thirteen years of success. Some of the failures are
quite substantial. In seven of the 1964–74 years, the government would
have had to borrow a second time an amount roughly equal to its initial
issuance of bonds to be able to pay the principal of the maturing bonds.
The autocorrelation in the success or failure of this strategy calls into
question one aspect of the MB and Aaron-Reischauer plans that we have
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Fig. 1.5 Net money generated at the completion of a swap of ten-year inﬂation-
indexed U.S. government bonds for common stocksnot yet modeled—namely, the fact that both plans advocate that the asset
swaps take place continuously. Both plans would phase in the private secu-
rities investments of the OASDI trust fund only gradually. One could hope
that some kind of “dollar-cost-averaging” phenomenon would make this
less risky than making the asset reallocation all at once. However, the
eleven failures in a row from 1964 through 1974 indicate that considerable
risk remains even with such a gradual transition. Had social security en-
gaged in this particular asset swap (ten-year inﬂation-indexed bonds for a
portfolio of the S&P500) from 1964 through 1974, the ﬁnancial crises that
the system faced in 1977 and again in 1983 would have been consider-
ably worsened.
We have also simulated how the asset swap of ten-year inﬂation-indexed
bonds for common stocks would perform in the future if future returns
and inﬂation rates were drawn from the 1927–97 set of realizations drawn
randomly with a bootstrap technique. The predicted overall failure rate
was 29 percent. That is, the stock portfolio failed to generate the necessary
3.5 percent real return required to pay oﬀ the obligations of the inﬂation-
indexed bonds 29 percent of the time. Had we deﬁned failure as the stock
investments falling short of the 7 percent real rate of return assumed in
scoring the MB plan in table 1.1, the failure rate would, of course, be
much higher.
The results for twenty-year inﬂation-indexed bonds are similar. Figure
1.6 shows the counterfactual history for asset swaps from 1927 through
1977. The strategy would have failed eighteen times out of the ﬁfty-one
years, for a failure rate of 35.3 percent. Even more telling is the fact that
it would have failed ﬁfteen years in a row from 1959 to 1973. The strategy
is very successful from 1932 through 1954 and again in 1975–77. This is
not surprising since we know that the average real return on the stock
market in 1927–97 has been well above 3.5 percent. The failure or limited
success of the strategy for twenty years in a row (1955–74), however, is a
big problem for its advocates. The overall failure rate when the 1927–97
inﬂation rates and stock market returns are scrambled with a bootstrap
technique of choosing the observations is 25.4 percent.
Table 1.2 sums up what we have learned thus far. We have examined a
total of four diﬀerent cases for asset swaps based on ten-year bonds and
the same four cases for twenty-year bonds. The bootstrap simulations are
probably more informative regarding the future chances of success for the
exchange than are the numbers based on the actual historical time series
of returns. That is because the future will not be a precise replay of the
past. The bootstrap simulation technique gives us a better handle on the
probability of future success. If real stock market returns are generated in
the future from the same distribution that generated the actual 1954–97
returns, and if real interest rates on bonds approximate 3.5 percent, then
the failure rate of a strategy of swapping bonds for stocks is about 29
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ﬁgures refer to the ﬁnal column of results in table 1.2. It is important to
note, however, that all variations of the asset-swap simulations that we
have conducted imply a considerable risk of failure.
1.4 Tax Considerations
We have ignored personal income tax issues thus far, but they deserve
some consideration. The federal government collects taxes on the returns
of stocks held in private hands and would recapture some of the interest
payments on the bonds through tax proceeds. If the average marginal tax
rate on the returns is the same for the stocks and bonds, then it is a fairly
minor correction to the results presented above. For instance, assume that
on the “other side” of the transaction are deﬁned-contribution pension
funds. Further, assume that, as people see that the social security trust
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Fig. 1.6 Net money generated at the completion of a swap of twenty-year
inﬂation-indexed U.S. government bonds for common stocks
Table 1.2 Summary of Failure Rates (%) of a Strategy of Swapping Bonds for
S&P500 Stocks
Actual Interest 3.5% Inﬂation- 3.5% Inﬂation-
Actual Interest Rates; Bootstrap Indexed Bonds; Indexed Bonds;
Rates; Actual Simulations of Actual 1927–97 Bootstrap
1954–97 Time Real Returns Time Series of Simulations of Real
Series of Chosen from Inﬂation and Returns Chosen
Bond Stock Market 1954–97 Stock Market from 1927–97
Maturity Returns Realizations Returns Realizations
10 years 20.6 22.1 29.5 29.0
20 years 0 6.2 35.3 25.4fund is moving out of bonds and into stocks, they are willing to move in
the opposite direction in their own IRA, 401(k), or other deﬁned-
contribution accounts (without a change in interest rates). If the average
marginal tax rate of the pension plan holders will be 25 percent when the
money is drawn out, then the government eﬀectively owns one-fourth of
the assets in the plan. If the government makes money on the swap on its
own account, it loses one-fourth of its proﬁts owing to its participation in
the deﬁned-contribution accounts (which took the other side of the asset
swap) via the tax system. The failure-rate analysis of the previous section
need not be modiﬁed, although the absolute size of the gains and losses is
reduced by 25 percent. If the other side of the transaction consisted of
corporate accounts backing deﬁned-beneﬁt pension promises, then the
gain or loss in the funding of the pension plan presumably would be re-
ﬂected in the stock of the corporation oﬀering the deﬁned-beneﬁt plan.
Stockholders will eventually pay capital gains taxes on their stock (sooner
rather than later if the stocks are held by an actively managed mutual
fund), and, once again, the government will ﬁnd itself with roughly a 20
or 25 percent position on the opposite side of the swap that it thought it
was engaged in. Also, once again, the failure-rate analysis of the previous
section is unaﬀected.
We think that pensions are the most likely “other side” of the asset-
swap transaction. We have also examined the case in which privately held
assets are exchanged with the government. If the average marginal tax rate
on the interest payments of the government exceeds the blended average
marginal tax rate faced by dividends and short- and long-term capital
gains from the stock returns, then the failure probabilities are slightly im-
proved by tax considerations. The government recaptures a higher per-
centage of its interest payments through the tax system than it did on the
return on common stocks. The eﬀect is fairly minor, however. We were
probably exploring the upper limit of the eﬀect in assuming that the aver-
age marginal income-tax rate on interest on the bonds was 33 percent,
whereas the average marginal tax rate on long-term capital gains was 20
percent. Both numbers are almost certainly on the high side, but the
diﬀerence may be reasonable. With such parameters, the projected failure
rate of issuing ﬁxed-interest-rate ten-year bonds turns out to be 25.1 per-
cent. The twenty-year-bond failure rate falls from 6.2 to 5.4 percent. The
failure rate for ten-year bonds remains 21.1 percent even if somehow the
stocks had paid zero taxes and the bonds faced an average marginal tax
rate of 33 percent. The worst case for the government is the opposite of
that, of course. If the bonds are somehow held in completely tax-free ac-
counts and the stocks are fully taxable (33 percent on dividends and short-
term capital gains and 20 percent on long-term capital gains), then the
predicted failure rate with ten-year ﬁxed-interest bonds jumps to 37.9
percent.
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order consideration but that the results of the previous section—that the
government issuing bonds and using the proceeds to buy stocks is very
risky—is not materially altered by including the eﬀects of taxes.
1.5 Interpretation of Failure Results
We feel that the most appropriate of our asset-swap simulations in terms
of predicting the likelihood of future failure of such a policy are those
that use the 3.5 percent real-interest-rate inﬂation-protected bonds and
generate real stock returns with the bootstrap procedure. These results are
relevant even if the government actually swaps nominal bonds for stocks
because the real interest cost of such bonds is far more likely to approxi-
mate 3.5 percent than the negative real interest rates that prevailed in the
1970s. The result is that the asset-swap strategy has about a 25 percent
chance of failure with twenty-year bonds. This means that there is a 25
percent chance that the switch into stocks will make the solvency problems
of social security worse rather than better after twenty years. Of course,
there is about a 50 percent chance that the strategy will not work as well
as assumed by its proponents (and listed in table 1.1). That is because the
7 percent real rate of return assumed in that table is roughly the median
long-run real rate of return for stocks.
Someone might take the view that, if stocks are behind after twenty
years, the government can simply borrow the shortfall (or more) and buy
yet more stocks. With a long enough time horizon, stocks are bound to
beat out bonds, right? First, this is not quite right. It is true that the proba-
bility of a shortfall is lower the longer the time horizon. Of course, the
magnitude of the shortfall in the unlikely event that stocks have a bad
forty- or ﬁfty-year run can be enormous if each intermediate shortfall is
covered with more borrowed money. Second, and probably more impor-
tant, the balance-sheet position of social security is economically and po-
litically important. The social security crises of 1977 and 1983 were caused
by the impending exhaustion of the OASDI trust fund. Of course, the
government could have bailed out the fund by borrowing money and
handing it over to social security. But that action was not seriously consid-
ered. Our point is that the trust fund would have been in even worse shape
in the late 1970s and early 1980s had it been investing in stocks in the
1960s instead of in the special issue Treasury bonds. In that case, the bene-
ﬁt cuts and tax increases would have been even more severe than they
were. One would not have been able to get through that period with the
argument that we can just borrow more money and buy more stocks and
sooner or later the strategy will pay oﬀ. The extra risks of stocks translate
directly into riskier future beneﬁts and taxes.
The failure probabilities that we have estimated are only as good as the
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In a number of respects, we have erred on the side of favoring the strategy.
First, we have assumed that the government could engage in the swap
without changing interest rates and stock market rates of return. Second,
we have assumed that future stock market returns will be generated from
the observed returns from 1954–97 (1927–97 in some cases). The average
real rate of return on stocks from 1954–97 was 9.7 percent. The average
from 1927–97 was 9.6 percent. Still, relative to either international com-
parisons or longer historical returns (Siegel 1994), these average returns
are quite high.
For most of the results that we have presented, we have worked with
three-year blocks of stock market returns. We have assumed that each of
the three-year blocks observed from 1954 to 1997 is equally likely to be
repeated, independent of the previous returns drawn. There is a literature
on long-run mean reversion that indicates that high returns are more likely
to follow low returns (and vice versa) (see, e.g., Poterba and Summers
1988; Fama and French 1988; and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997,
chap. 2). Were this true, then long-horizon investing would be safer than
if returns were drawn independently from previous realizations. The statis-
tical evidence on long-run mean reversion is not very powerful for the
same reason that we have had to downplay our actual counterfactual re-
sults—there simply are not many long runs to observe in order to investi-
gate such long-run phenomena. The empirical studies that have been con-
ducted cannot rule out that returns are actually serially independent. With
that said, all that we can say is that, if returns were generated by a process
exhibiting long-run mean reversion, then the asset-swap strategy would
fail less often than we have estimated. Our simulations of the asset-swap
strategy using one-, two-, three-, and ﬁve-year blocks of data showed
roughly the same failure probabilities. This indicates that, to the extent
that it operates in under ﬁve years, mean reversion is at most a relatively
weak phenomenon.
Our overall conclusion is that the simpliﬁcations in this study have not
biased the results against the asset-swap policy. The relatively high mean
return that we assume for equities must be at least as important an as-
sumption as the lack of mean reversion in returns over periods greater
than three years. If asked the likelihood that investing some of the central
trust fund of social security in equities would worsen its ﬁnances in ten
or twenty years, our best-guess answer would be that there is a 25–30
percent chance.
1.6 Is a Universal Deﬁned-Beneﬁt Retirement Plan Feasible?
Our conclusion thus far has the usual “no-free-lunch” ring to it. Unfor-
tunately, one cannot eliminate the actuarial deﬁcit of social security by
swapping bonds for stocks. If it were possible, then we would also do well
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raises the question of who bears the risks in the current social security
system and who would bear the additional risks were the trust fund to
invest in private securities as advocated by the MB and the Aaron-
Reischauer plans. Even more fundamentally, it raises the issue of whether
it is feasible for the government to oﬀer a deﬁned-beneﬁt plan with univer-
sal coverage.
At one extreme, consider a deﬁned-beneﬁt plan oﬀered by a ﬁnancially
strong company such as General Motors. The company can promise its
workers a particular or “deﬁned” beneﬁt in retirement and fund that obli-
gation with private stocks and bonds. The worker can accumulate a vested,
safe retirement beneﬁt (although not safe from the eﬀects of inﬂation),
while the ﬁrm, or, more accurately, its stockholders, bears the investment
risks of the underlying portfolio. The point is that it is quite transparent
how a safe beneﬁt was created from risky investments—the risky residual
claim is borne by the General Motors stockholders.
At the other extreme, consider what would happen if a self-employed
person decided that he would like to provide himself a deﬁned-beneﬁt
pension funded with stocks and bonds. Is it feasible? Can a person invest,
say, $30,000 in stocks and bonds and promise himself or herself a safe
retirement beneﬁt of $3,000 per year? The answer is no since the employer
bears the risk of the assets not being adequate to fund the beneﬁts. But a
self-employed person is both employee and employer. The investment risks
have not been transferred at all, and, therefore, the do-it-yourself deﬁned-
beneﬁt strategy cannot work. The only way for a self-employed person to
end up with a deﬁned-beneﬁt-like retirement claim is to contract with an
insurance company or some other third party that will provide the beneﬁt
and assume the investment risks.
Now consider a universal coverage deﬁned-beneﬁt social security
retirement-pension system funded with risky private securities. Is it pos-
sible to provide safe retirement beneﬁts as in the General Motors example,
or is it more like the example of the self-employed person who cannot
make meaningful retirement-beneﬁt promises without the help of a third
party? If everyone is in the social security system, then collectively every-
one bears the investment risk, and it makes little sense to call the program
a deﬁned-beneﬁt scheme. We can think of only two ways to maintain the
deﬁned-beneﬁt nature of the system. One is to divide the population by
age cohort. Conceivably, the elderly can be promised safe beneﬁts with the
young playing the role of the insurance company and bearing the invest-
ment risks of the underlying portfolio. The future payroll taxes or the
future beneﬁts of the young will be more risky if the trust fund engages in
the kind of asset swap that we have been analyzing. One of the drawbacks
of a deﬁned-beneﬁt structure is that the risks imposed on the young are
not very transparent. If we maintain the deﬁned beneﬁts for both the old
and the young, then the taxes faced by the young will be even more vola-
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private securities, which we have documented above, have to be borne by
someone. The deﬁned-beneﬁt nature of the system does not work very well
if the investment risks are borne by those paying the personal income tax.
The reason is that there is a nearly complete overlap between social secu-
rity participants and those paying the personal income tax. In order to
create a safe asset from a risky portfolio, the risks must be shifted to some-
one other than the holder of the supposedly safe claim. Shifting the risks
from social security participants to taxpayers is not enough of a shift to
accomplish this.
At least conceptually, the investment risks could be shifted internation-
ally. Shiller (1998) makes this point in his theoretical paper on risks and
social security. The Europeans, for instance, could play the role of the
insurance company and oﬀer Americans a safe deﬁned-beneﬁt pension
system by assuming the investment risks themselves. There is a question
of what terms they would demand to hold all the risks. Further, while it is
clear that there are advantages of the young and old and the Europeans
and Americans all sharing in the risks of global ﬁnancial markets, it is not
at all clear why one group (the young or the Europeans) should hold all
the risk so that another group (the elderly Americans) can enjoy a safe,
deﬁned-beneﬁt retirement program. The optimal risk-sharing arrange-
ment would have everyone bearing some risk, and, thus, any optimal uni-
versal pension plan would not be strictly of a deﬁned-beneﬁt type.
One problem with investing the central OASDI trust fund in private
securities that we have not emphasized is the danger that the investment
decisions would be subject to political pressure and, therefore, would not
manage risk eﬃciently. There would undoubtedly be pressure to invest in
only American companies or only unionized companies or to allocate the
investments evenly across the ﬁfty states or not to invest in tobacco com-
panies or those doing business in Burma. Aaron and Reischauer are con-
ﬁdent that certain organizational structures that they propose (including
the creation of a “Social Security Reserve Board”) could insulate fund
management from political control by elected oﬃcials. We are not so sure.
It is quite possible that capital would be less eﬃciently allocated with gov-
ernment ownership of equities, meaning that the asset swap could reduce
aggregate future GDP.
1.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the risk of having the central OASDI
trust fund invest in private securities. We have noted that that net transac-
tion is an asset swap with the government selling bonds to the public and
using the proceeds to buy a portfolio of common stocks of equal value.
The asset reallocation does not increase saving, wealth, or GDP. We exam-
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system. We adopt a convention that the asset swap is deemed successful if
the stock portfolio generates suﬃcient cash to pay oﬀ the interest and
principal of the bonds and still have money left over and a failure if the
stock portfolio is insuﬃcient to do that and the bond repayments require
another round of borrowing. We have looked at several cases, including
ten- and twenty-year ﬁxed-interest-rate bonds and ten- and twenty-year
inﬂation-indexed debt. The predicted failure rate from the bootstrap simu-
lations of future returns ranges from 6 to 29 percent. Further, failure
would be autocorrelated with long strings of possible annual failures. For
instance, when we examined the counterfactual issuance of twenty-year
inﬂation-indexed bonds, we found that the asset-swap strategy failed ﬁf-
teen years in a row between 1959 and 1973. Clearly, this policy cannot
reliably reduce the actuarial deﬁcit of social security.
Individual accounts and deﬁned-contribution pension plans certainly
involve signiﬁcant risks. An individual who shifts from bonds to stocks
runs the same or greater risk that the move will be counterproductive after
ten or twenty years. However, the deﬁned-contribution plans have the ad-
vantage that their risks are straightforward. Further, people who want to
minimize risks can invest in such safe assets as inﬂation-indexed bonds.
The analysis of this paper has shown that an OASDI trust fund invested
in private securities would generate risk for Americans, but the precise
incidence of that risk would likely remain ambiguous.
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Comment Stephen P. Zeldes
As the debate over social security reform progresses, it is becoming in-
creasingly obvious that many of the key issues relate to uncertainty. One
question that arises is in what ways the beneﬁt payments to the elderly
should be linked to the outcomes of key economic and demographic vari-
ables in the economy—such as mortality, real wages, birthrates, unem-
ployment, interest rates, and stock returns. A second question is what
techniques should be used to evaluate, on an ex ante basis, reform propos-
als that involve risky outcomes.
Consider ﬁrst the current evaluation techniques used by the Oﬃce of
the Actuary at the Social Security Administration (SSA). The actuaries
estimate the most likely outcome for a set of economic and demographic
variables—these are referred to as intermediate-cost assumptions. The ac-
tuarial balance, projected path of the trust fund, and money’s-worth mea-
sures (e.g., net present value and internal rates of return to participants)
are based on these assumptions. These provide a reasonable assessment of
the expected outcome for the system and for individuals. They do not
attempt to incorporate the riskiness of any variables. The SSA incorpo-
rates uncertainty only by describing two alternate scenarios: high and low
cost. While this does provide some information about the dispersion in
possible outcomes, it is an incomplete and inadequate way of dealing with
uncertainty, for the following reasons. First, this technique does not assign
probabilities to the diﬀerent outcomes. Second, it ignores correlations be-
tween variables, both economic and demographic. Third, when examining
reforms, it ignores general equilibrium eﬀects—the eﬀects of these reforms
on the underlying demographic and economic variables.
The SSA is careful to point out that its goal is to examine expected
values and that it is not attempting to account for risk. However, many
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reau of Economic Research.who use money’s-worth and other SSA statistics inappropriately interpret
them as corresponding to welfare or utility rankings when in fact they do
not. Since most of the reform packages that have been proposed involve
investment in the stock market, through either individual accounts or a
central trust fund, it is particularly problematic to use non-risk-adjusted
money’s-worth measures to rank the attractiveness of alternative reforms,
both versus the current system and versus each other (for more on this
issue, see Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes [1999]).
MaCurdy and Shoven examine the potential risks and beneﬁts to social
security of undertaking an open market operation selling Treasury bonds
and using the proceeds to purchase stocks, to be held either in the trust
fund or in individual accounts. This, as well as analyzing any reform plan
that involves stock market investment, requires an understanding of the
equity premium: the diﬀerence between the return on equities and the
return on Treasury bills or bonds. How we think about the equity pre-
mium and to what we attribute it are key to understanding many of the
issues raised at this conference.
Since the stock market has a higher expected return than the bond mar-
ket, this change in investment policy improves both the actuarial balance
of the system and the money’s worth as currently measured. It also typi-
cally increases the risk. Evaluating by how much the risk increases and
assessing the trade-oﬀ of whether the higher return is worth the higher
risk are diﬃcult to do and in general require using a stochastic general
equilibrium model. Such an approach has been followed in many of the
papers included in this volume. These models have the advantages that
they remedy the three problems described above; that is, they assign prob-
ability distributions, allow for correlations between variables, and incorpo-
rate the general equilibrium eﬀects that can be crucial to the analysis.
They also, by necessity, oversimplify the world that they are modeling—
sacriﬁcing realism at the expense of tractability.
MaCurdy and Shoven have an alternative approach with a more modest
goal. Rather than analyzing the entire general equilibrium model, they
analyze important properties of the joint distribution of stock and bond
returns.
First, consider the basic facts. Table 1C.1 shows the means and standard
deviations of annual real returns on stocks and government bonds from
1926 to 1997. The average real return on the S&P500 was 9.7 percent, as
compared to 2.6 and 2.3 percent on long- and intermediate-term Treasury
bonds, respectively, and 0.7 percent on short-term Treasury bills. The
higher historical return on stocks is seen even more dramatically in ﬁgure
1C.1. One dollar invested in December 1925 would have grown (in con-
stant dollars) to $203.19 if invested in the S&P500, to $4.34 if invested
in long-term government bonds, and to $1.58 if invested in three-month
Treasury bills.
The higher average return on stocks is clear. What about the risk? Look-
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returns were 20.5 percent on stocks, 10.5 percent on long-term bonds, 7.0
percent on intermediate-term bonds, and 4.2 percent on Treasury bills.
The higher standard deviation on stocks suggests that stocks are riskier
than bonds, but it is not suﬃcient evidence, for a few reasons. First, it is
possible that stocks dominate bonds in every period: for example, rS  rB
 ε, where rS is the annual return on stocks, rB is the annual return on
bonds, and ε is a random variable that has high variance but is always
nonnegative (i.e., ε is  0 with probability one). In general, we need a
stochastic model together with a utility function to evaluate riskiness. But,
if stocks dominate bonds in this sense, then no such model is necessary. A
Table 1C.1 Annual Inﬂation-Adjusted Returns on Stocks and Government
Bonds, 1926–97
Arithmetic Average
Asset Return (%) SD (%)
S&P500 9.7 20.5
Long-term government bond 2.6 10.5
Intermediate-term government bond 2.3 7.0
Short-term Treasury bill .7 4.2
Source: Calculations are based on data from Ibbotson Associates.
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Fig. 1C.1 Stocks, long-term bonds, and Treasury bills, cumulative real
returns, 1926–97simple glance at the data on annual returns tells us that this is not the
case. There are many years when the return on stocks is negative and the
return on bonds is positive. A second possibility is that risk is best mea-
sured by looking at long-horizon returns rather than annual returns. If
there is suﬃcient mean reversion in stock returns, it is possible that, when
examining long returns (e.g., twenty-year returns), stocks dominate bonds
in the sense described above. An examination of twenty-year rolling an-
nual returns indicates that there was only one twenty-year period in which
stocks did not outperform both long-term bonds and Treasury bills, and
even in this one period the diﬀerence was small. Some observers (e.g.,
Siegel 1998; and Glassman and Hassett 1998) argue that this type of evi-
dence implies that stocks are not more risky than bonds in the long run.
There is much debate in the literature about what can be learned from
the historical data about the ex ante expected return (in the past and in
the future), the riskiness of stocks relative to bonds (in the past and in the
future), and whether the higher expected return is/was a fair compensa-
tion for higher risk (in the past and in the future).
Table 1C.2 is my attempt to summarize the many views on this question.
Where in table 1C.2 one stands is likely to be related to how attractive
one ﬁnds reform proposals that involve social security investments in the
stock market.
The ﬁrst row of table 1C.2, the “faith-in-markets” view, argues that any
equity premium that exists is fair compensation for the riskiness of stocks.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) accept that expected excess returns were high
in the past and that stocks were riskier but argue that they were not suﬃ-
ciently risky, on the basis of a standard model of the economy, to justify
the higher risk. One could interpret this result as implying either that the
markets have it wrong and are providing too much compensation for stock
market risk or that the standard model is wrong and is incorrectly estimat-
ing the amount of risk or expected return of the stock market. A variety
of papers have attempted to explain this “equity-premium puzzle,” either
by arguing that ex post returns were much higher than what was expected
ex ante or by arguing that with alternative utility functions risk was actu-
ally much higher than Mehra and Prescott estimated. MaCurdy and Sho-
ven do not address the question of whether the equity premium is correctly
compensating for risk, but they do challenge the view that stocks are less
risky than bonds in the long run (i.e., the view represented in the rows at
the bottom of the table).
MaCurdy and Shoven point out that one possible problem with simply
examining long-period returns in the past is that there are not many data
points, only three and a half independent twenty-year periods between
1926 and 1997—far too few to summarize the distribution of twenty-year
returns adequately. They try to get around this problem of limited data by
bootstrapping: they assume that the annual returns are representative of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ythe underlying probability distribution, and they draw observations ran-
domly from the sample with replacement. They do this in two ways: ﬁrst,
by drawing single years of stock-return data with replacement and, sec-
ond, by drawing three-year blocks of stock-return data with replacement.
They then construct a thousand observations of ten- and twenty-year
stock returns, match these with interest rates on ten- and twenty-year gov-
ernment bonds from the ﬁrst year of each period, and use these con-
structed data to calculate a “failure rate,” that is, the percentage of times
for each starting year that stocks fail to outperform bonds.
I have two main criticisms of the technique used by MaCurdy and Sho-
ven. First, they use nominal rather than real returns when performing
their bootstraps. Normally, when computing excess returns on stocks rela-
tive to bonds, it makes no diﬀerence whether real or nominal returns are
used as the inﬂation rate drops out of the diﬀerential. But with their boot-
strapping method it does matter because the dates for the stock returns
do not correspond to the dates covered by the interest rates. For example,
the ten-year nominal interest rate in 1981 was high, reﬂecting high inﬂa-
tion expectations. MaCurdy and Shoven compare this nominal return to
a series of nominal stock returns, the ﬁrst year of which is 1981, but the
other years of which are drawn randomly from the sample, thus likely
including many years with low expected inﬂation. Although stock returns
are unlikely to compensate for unexpected inﬂation, they are likely to com-
pensate for expected inﬂation. Using nominal returns incorporates a mis-
matching that might explain why their calculated failure rate for stocks
outperforming bonds is so high in the early 1980s (when expected inﬂation
is high) and so low in the 1950s (when expected inﬂation is low). It would
be worth reestimating their results using real returns rather than nominal
ones to see whether the results are sensitive to this change.
Second, and more important, their results are unlikely to persuade
those who argue that stocks are not risky over the long run. Although I
do not believe this view, let me temporarily play devil’s advocate. The argu-
ment that stocks are not more risky than bonds over long holding periods,
even though they are over short holding periods, depends crucially on
long-term mean reversion in stock returns. In other words, strings of bad
returns must tend to be followed by strings of good returns. Because the
bootstrap method randomly draws three-year blocks of data, it will by
construction not pick up these long-term correlations. In their simulated
data, a three-year period of low returns is, by construction, as likely to be
followed by periods of low returns as it is by periods of high returns.
Therefore, it cannot possibly capture the long-term mean reversion that is
crucial to reducing the long-run riskiness of stocks.
To see this more clearly, suppose that we were looking at the riskiness,
not of stocks, but of thirty-year zero-coupon bonds. For simplicity, as-
sume that inﬂation was always zero. Because of real-interest-rate risk, the
Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation 37one-year-holding-period returns on these bonds are risky. However, high
one-year returns in one part of the sample must be followed by low one-
year returns later in the sample, and the thirty-year real return on these
bonds is completely riskless. Were the MaCurdy-Shoven bootstrap tech-
nique applied to these bonds, it would miss the long-term mean reversion,
and it would lead to the erroneous conclusion that thirty-year real returns
on these bonds are very risky.
With that said, let me emphasize that the MaCurdy-Shoven conclusion
that there is risk in stocks relative to bonds, even in the long run, is
probably correct. Certainly, a market test would lead to this conclusion.
Consider a $1 million portfolio in the S&P500. Were we to ask a large in-
surance company how much it would charge to guarantee that, thirty years
from today, the portfolio would be worth at least as much as the amount
in an initial $1 million portfolio invested in thirty-year bonds, it would
probably charge a substantial amount and would certainly not provide
this option for free. This is, of course, subject to the critique that insurance
companies do not understand the risks of the market either.
Suppose that we accept the MaCurdy-Shoven conclusion that stocks
are riskier than bonds. The next questions are whether they are suﬃciently
riskier to justify the high equity premium and whether social security
could beneﬁt by doing a swap of stocks for bonds. These are questions that
MaCurdy and Shoven do not address. As described earlier, they require a
stochastic general equilibrium model. It may very well be that there are
tails of the distribution of stock returns that involve low returns and that
the marginal utility of consumption is very high in those states of the
world. Ignoring or downplaying those states may make the equity pre-
mium look like a giveaway.
The question of whether social security could beneﬁt from an open mar-
ket swap is not fully answered by examining the riskiness of stocks. Even
if stocks completely dominated bonds over long horizons and participants
in the asset markets did not realize this, we would need to balance the
losses of the sellers of equity against the gains to social security partici-
pants. On the other hand, even if the equity premium is a fair compensa-
tion for the risk borne by current stock market participants, there may
still be a role for social security to improve risk sharing. This could be
done, for example, by providing exposure to current stock market returns
to those without it: adults who are nonstockholders, children, and those
not yet born (for more on this, see, e.g., Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and
Zeldes [1998, 1999] and most of the papers in the present volume).
Overall, this is a helpful paper that contributes in an important way to
the debate on the relative riskiness of stocks and bonds in the long run
and the attractiveness of investing social security funds in the stock mar-
ket. This paper and others in this volume appropriately focus the debate
on the risk-return trade-oﬀs inherent in such a change.
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Discussion Summary
Robert Shiller remarked that long-term bonds are quite risky because of
the institutional feature that a single person, currently Alan Greenspan,
can aﬀect their value substantially, for instance, in response to political
pressure. Stephen Zeldes concurred and noted that it is therefore impor-
tant to consider three-asset models, with short-term bills, long-term
bonds, and stocks.
James Poterba noted that dynamic hedging could be used to at least
partially hedge the risk of holding equities. He also wondered whether the
criticism of the discussant, Zeldes, concerning the use of nominal rather
than real returns in the bootstrap simulation method would have signiﬁ-
cant implications. He noted that the correlation between equity returns
and inﬂation is low. In response to this discussion, John Shoven noted that
Zeldes’s suggestion to repeat the simulation exercise with real returns
would be incorporated in the ﬁnal version of the paper.
John Campbell remarked that the Siegel view has an internal inconsis-
tency. If stocks are less risky in the long run owing to mean reversion, then
one must also accept that expected stock returns are time varying. But, in
that case, one cannot logically recommend a buy-and-hold strategy, as
Siegel does. Instead, mean reversion in stock returns and the associated
time variation in expected equity returns imply that the optimal portfolio
strategy involves some market timing. One cannot simultaneously assert
that stocks are less risky in the long run owing to mean reversion and that
a buy-and-hold strategy is optimal since the latter requires independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) returns or constant expected returns.
Campbell recommended that MaCurdy and Shoven be more explicit
Asset Allocation and Risk Allocation 39about their view on this data-generating process in the paper since it mat-
ters so much for the results.
David Cutler asked whether these experiments would not correspond
more to borrowing against tax revenues than to using long-term debt since
the rate of return seems to be based on wages, not on real interest rates in
the economy. Martin Feldstein concurred but also noted that the authors
are substituting stocks for bonds in the portfolio explicitly. There are two
distinct policies: one in which assets are simply being swapped, without
changing taxes (as suggested by Aaron and Reischauer and by Ball), and
one that involves raising taxes.
When asked by Feldstein whether he had discussed the paper with
Aaron, Shoven replied that Aaron was not pleased with the results. Feld-
stein responded that this was not surprising. He added that their argument
would be that, although there is a small probability of a shortfall, they
choose to take this risk on behalf of the taxpayer. Feldstein concluded that
Shoven is well hedged, having written papers about the beneﬁts of in-
vesting the trust fund in equities (e.g., MaCurdy and Shoven 1992) and
now showing that this also involves substantial risk.
Shoven responded that one has to make the distinction between a de-
ﬁned-beneﬁt and a deﬁned-contribution plan in this respect. While a de-
ﬁned-contribution plan is typically perceived as risky, the deﬁned-beneﬁt-
based plan is purported to be safe, yet is not, and becomes, moreover,
signiﬁcantly more risky when investing in equities.
Shoven acknowledged that any form of long-run mean reversion is not
captured by the bootstrap experiment that takes an i.i.d. view. He noted
that Poterba’s question about the possibility of using dynamic hedging to
intervene in the face of adverse conditions was worth pursuing.
Finally, Shoven emphasized that the political rhetoric appears to de-
scribe the current system as involving both deﬁned beneﬁts and deﬁned
taxes. This is misleading and even more incorrect when investing the trust
fund in risky securities.
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